Democracy and Development Progress in Africa
Can multi-party democracy work in societies riven by ethnic division and weak institutions?
The winds of change blew through Africa in the 1950s and 1960s as the continent underwent rapid decolonisation. From Accra to Addis Ababa, jubilant Africans celebrated their newfound independence and looked expectantly towards a bright future built on the foundations of democracy and self-determination.
But as we reach the 60th anniversary of many African nations, we must ask the question: Has the democratic experiment succeeded in delivering on its lofty promises? Let us embark on an adventure through the annals of Africa’s chaotic democratic history to find out!
Our journey started in 1960, Africa’s official “Year of Independence”. During this year, 17 countries gained their freedom from colonial rule. The air was optimistic, with leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana proclaiming that democratic socialism would bring rapid industrialisation and growth. Musicians sang songs of unity and Pan-African brotherhood. After decades of oppression, the future seemed limitless.
Yet it didn’t take long for the rifts to emerge. Within a year, the Congo Crisis erupted into conflict and political instability that still haunts today’s nation. Military coups became de rigueur as power-hungry men with big hats and even bigger egos scrapped the endless debates of parliamentary rule for the simplicity of government by gunpoint.
By the 1970s, fledgling democracies were dropping like flies as Idi Amin, Mobutu Sese Seko, and the infamous Big Man himself, Jean-Bedel Bokassa, embraced the dictator lifestyle. Development took a backseat to lavish self-enrichment projects. Gala state dinners and champagne pools were preferred over bothersome tasks like building roads, hospitals and power plants. But the Big Men had spoken - who were the little people to complain?
As the 1980s brought global economic malaise, Africa suffered while the elites continued to play. Nigeria’s wisely chosen leaders invested billions in a massive steel industry that made zero steel but delighted Swiss bank managers. Zimbabwe’s thoughtful father-of-the-nation burned surplus crops during famine while prancing about in fine suits preaching peasant prosperity. Young boys with AK-47s became the heirs-apparent in failed states like Liberia and Sierra Leone. Africa was indeed on the march to progress.
By the 1990s, the donor community had seen enough. Aid would be conditional on democratic reforms, they said, as multi-party elections became the new fashion. Zambia led the way, voting the independence party out of power after three decades. Kenya tried it but found opposition leaders had a peculiar tendency to drop dead on the campaign trail. Still, the Standard Operating Procedure of multi-party elections, heavy rigging and post-election violence were codified across the continent.
Four decades of independence had cured the excessive exuberance of the 1960s. But with open political space could come economic dynamism unshackled from oppressive state controls. The market devotees of the World Bank assured us that trade liberalisation was the path to Valhalla. Donor dollars were dangled like a divine carrot in front of indebted governments. “Slash those tariffs and constrain public spending”, the experts urged, “Forget about financing health, education and other frills”.
When results failed to materialise, more policy panaceas were deployed. Microfinance would fix poverty, public-private partnerships would build infrastructure, and mobile phones would create a digital revolution. Mineral-rich countries were told their wealth would fuel development through the magic of foreign investment and trickle-down earnings.
Yet instability persisted, and democratisation empowered ethnic and regional rivalries suppressed during decades of one-party rule. New waves of conflict engulfed countries like Cote D’Ivoire, sparking brutal fights over land, belonging and the right to exploit state resources. Even in the best times, politicians found ethnic favouritism expedient for winning elections. The New Big Men sat atop patronage networks that made parliaments little more than rubber stamps for backroom deals and budgets filled with upkeep for their support bases.
Through it all, the aid industry cheerfully provided technical assistance to improve governance and transparency that nobody asked for. When leaders were overly greedy and unwilling to change, they would often be featured on the front pages of Western newspapers with titles such as “The Madman of Harare.” A new round of handwringing would ensue until the headlines moved on, and the donors found another “reform-minded” crony to provide budget support.
Yet today, we stand in 2023, over sixty years into the grand African democratic experiment, and can we honestly say the continent looks markedly different from those promising early days when independence dawned? While progress has been made, it is hardly the quantum leap envisioned by the founding fathers.
Poverty and infant mortality remain stubbornly high, while life expectancy lags behind all other developing regions. Decades of 5% annual GDP growth have bought flashy consumption for a tiny few but failed to dent unemployment and deep inequality. Even with booming oil wealth, Nigeria has 60% of its citizens below the poverty line. 40% of Africa’s children are chronically malnourished. The digital revolution brings TikTok to Africa’s youth but few jobs or chances to impact the ossified political systems meaningfully.
And so the show goes on. Kenya stands ready to repeat its ritual brutal election year. The Congolese cling to the Kabila dynasty like it’s their only defence against another descent into chaos. Mali welcomes Wagner mercenaries to fortify the latest military coup against Islamists who filled the gaps left by a retreating state. Central Africa is a revolving door of autocrats sensing opportunity in political turbulence. Even Ghana, long a bastion of democratic stability, has witnessed worrying attempts to suppress dissent against deteriorating economic conditions.
What exactly can we attribute these development failures to after sixty years of self-determination? Indeed part of the blame lies with a colonial legacy that left newly independent states with little indigenous capacity to deliver the most basic government functions. But we must also be willing to critically examine whether today’s aid industry darling - democratic governance - has proven capable of ushering sustained economic and social transformation.
The current systems seem only to reproduce a cadre of self-interested political elites more adept at maintaining external legitimacy than driving development. They iterate the forms and functions of governance - elections, transparency initiatives, anti-corruption authorities - but the outcomes must match expectations. The aid flows, and the revolving door of optimistic technocrats continues despite the litany of disappointments.
So as we take another turn in the cycle, it is time to ask some fundamental questions. Can multi-party democracy work in societies riven by ethnic division and weak institutions? Does it make sense to focus so intensely on governance form while ignoring the dysfunctions of the overall system? Are liberalisation policies prescribed compatible with the structure of African economies?
We see the cracks widening, with democratic backsliding led by those promising order and security against the chaos of the current model. So far, the prescriptions remain the same - more accountability, inclusion, and election monitoring. Will this solution genuinely address the root cause of the discontent and delivery problems? It may be time to contemplate more comprehensive reforms.
Sixty years later, the initial euphoric visions of independence have collided with harsh realities. But recycling the current mix of dysfunctional democracy, mismatched economics, and technocratic hubris is unlikely to deliver structural change. Africa’s development potential remains undiminished. Perhaps it is time to envision new models anchored in the continent’s lived experiences rather than abstractions imposed from abroad. The future of the world’s youthful population, who will constitute 40% of humanity by 2100, depends on getting this right.
As the freedom fighters of the 1950s sensed, democracy and self-determination offer a powerful platform for realising the creative potential of Africa’s people. But it must be a democracy designed to solve local problems with local realities in mind, not just imported models and empty symbols of progress. Africa’s young innovators are ready with abundant technological tools unimaginable to the independent generation. The challenge is marrying their energy and creativity with accountable political leadership and citizen-centred economic priorities.
With the proper lessons from history absorbed, Africa can yet fulfil the elusive promise of its democratic journey. The path forward begins with asking honest, tough questions and having the courage to envision a new type of democracy powered by the continent’s unmatched dynamism and resilience. For Africa’s next sixty years, perhaps it is finally time to dispense with imported illusions and enable homegrown solutions.